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Europeans want more political leadership from leading personalities and 
groups of countries. If the new treaty enters into force, there will be more 
leaders on the European level. This politicization will be beneficial as far 
as the European Union is concerned. However, in addition to such leading 
politicians, the EU needs new and constructive coalitions. In an EU 27 
with its diverse interests there is only one realistic constellation of coun-
tries capable of providing leadership: the big three. 
Shortly before the EU constitutional sum-
mit in June 2007, the Bertelsmann Foun-
dation conducted a representative survey 
in selected EU member states, the subject 
of which was political leadership, leading 
personalities, and leadership groups in the 
EU. The interviewees were citizens of 16 
EU countries: Bulgaria, Denmark, Ger-
many, Estonia, France, the United King-
dom, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Aus-
tria, Poland, Sweden, Slovenia, Spain, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary. The popula-
tion of the chosen states amounts to 88% 
of the total population of the EU. The in-
terviews took place between 14 May and 
18 June 2007. This “spotlight europe” pre-
sents the results of the survey and de-
scribes the challenges facing political 
leadership in the EU. 
 
I 
Leading personalities and 
suitable candidates 
The elucidation and implementation of co-
herent draft policies and fundamental 
changes in direction, and the way conflicts 
are dealt with in the democratic arena is 
very closely bound up with the people who 
have the task of providing leadership.  
 
When asked which individual should as-
sume a strong political leadership role in 
the EU, 26%, a relative majority, were in  
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favour of Angela Merkel. José Manuel Bar-
roso came second, with 19%, followed by 
Gordon Brown and Nicolas Sarkozy, each 
with 14% 
 
The head of 
the German 
government 
obtained the 
highest rat-
ings in Ger-
many (58%), 
Slovenia 
(48%), and 
France (36%). 
In Denmark, 
Spain, Italy, 
Austria and 
Estonia 
Merkel’s rat-
ings were also 
above the 
European av-
erage. On the 
other hand, in 
Hungary and 
Bulgaria only 
8% and 9% of 
the interview-
ees respectively were in favour of strong 
leadership provided by the German Chan-
cellor. Similarly, in the United Kingdom 
only 11% of the interviewees were of this 
opinion. 
 
In contrast to Merkel, Barroso’s ratings are 
the result of a consistently high level of 
approval in the countries included in the 
survey. Only the Germans and the Bul-
garians deviate more than 9 percentage 
points from the median. The German in-
terviewees are more positive–40% expect 
more leadership from Berlaymont–and the 
Bulgarians are more negative. Only 5% of 
the interviewees believe that Barroso is 
capable of becoming a leading personality. 
 
The ratings for Brown and Sarkozy differ 
considerably in the various member states. 
Thus 41% of the French as well as 30% of 
the Germans hope that Sarkozy will pro-
vide more leadership. However, only 6% of 
the Swedes and the Bulgarians are in fa-
vour of assigning a stronger leadership 
role to the French president. Opinions are 
also divided when it comes to the head of 
the British government. Whereas in Bul-
garia, Estonia, Italy, Austria, Spain and 
Hungary no more than 7% believe that new 
European policy initiatives will come from 
Downing Street, 50% of the British, as well 
as 31% of the Germans and the Irish place 
their faith in the new prime minister. 
 
Only 15% of the interviewees were of the 
opinion that no single person should as-
sume a strong leadership role on the 
European level. Here the new member 
states and Austria are more sceptical than 
the core countries of the old EU. 
 
II 
Leadership groups and 
how to find them 
Europeans are in favour of more leading 
political figures and more leadership from 
specific groups of countries. Only 13% of 
the interviewees are against small leader- 
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ship groups made up of a number of coun-
tries chosen for this purpose. A relative 
majority of the interviewees (one in three) 
was of the opinion that in future the Euro-
group will assume a greater leadership 
role. The ratings of the Eurogroup are to a 
large extent the result of a high level of 
support in the countries which are among 
its members. Medium-sized states such as 
the Netherlands and Spain, which other-
wise do not see themselves as part of a 
leadership group, believe that greater im-
portance should be attached to the Euro-
zone. 
 
The views expressed by the British are es-
pecially in-
teresting. 
Despite the 
fact that the 
United 
Kingdom 
continues to 
oppose the 
introduction 
of the euro, 
29% assign a 
leadership 
role to the 
Eurogroup. 
45% of the 
Slovenes 
support the 
Eurogroup, 
which is 
hardly sur-
prising in 
view of the 
fact that Slo-
venia is the 
first of the 
new EU member states to have gained ad-
mittance. All the other central and eastern 
European states are more or less critical of 
leadership groups of any grouping what-
soever. A third of the Bulgarians, Czechs 
and Hungarians, in contrast to what the 
rest of Europe thinks, are totally against 
leadership by groups of countries. 
 
The most easily conceivable small leader-
ship group consists of the big three, Ger-
many, France, and the United Kingdom. 
This combination comes in second place. 
Support for this particular constellation 
emanates from the three countries them-
selves, but also from Denmark and Swe-
den. If the interviewees are to be believed, 
then the Franco-German motor is defunct. 
Whereas 30% of the French believe in a 
Franco-German leadership role, in Ger-
many only 16% are of this opinion, and in 
Europe as a whole only 10% share this 
view. Like the British, the Germans are 
a l s o  i n  f a v o u r  o f  m o r e  l e a d e r s h i p  b y  t h e  
big three. 5% are in favour of the Weimar 
triangle made up of Poland, France and 
Germany, which lags a long way behind.  
Since there are now 27 member states, 
Germany and France can no longer, as in 
the past, be the sole moving forces in the 
European Union. Nevertheless they will 
certainly form part of any leadership 
group. Furthermore, the data demonstrate 
that, in addition to the United Kingdom, 
Poland also wishes to be part of a leader-
ship group. The Weimar triangle has obvi-
ously failed to achieve this political goal. 
Whereas 23% of the Poles are in favour of 
this arrangement, both the Germans and  
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the French reject the idea of forming a 
leadership group with Poland. In Germany 
and France only 6% and 4% of the inter-
viewees respectively are in favour of the 
Weimar triangle. 
 
The results of the survey draw attention to 
three developments: 
 
•  Europeans are not only interested in the 
leadership qualities of their own national 
politicians, but also in those of politicians 
from other large nations, and indeed of 
leading European politicians. The leader-
ship qualities and political abilities of the 
actors now tend to be scrutinized and 
evaluated by a pan-European public. It is 
certainly true that membership of a nation 
plays a role in determining a preference 
for certain groups of countries. However, 
since public opinion has become increas-
ingly Europeanized, the call for more lead-
ership is also directed at politicians in 
other member states. 
„Brussels is also becoming 
a political point of  
reference in the  
national sphere.” 
•  The relatively high approval ratings for 
José Barroso, the President of the Commis-
sion, underlines the fact that national poli-
ticians are not the only ones who ought to 
assume a leadership role in Europe. The 
electorate is beginning increasingly to 
perceive the European Commission and its 
president as a European leadership insti-
tution. Brussels is also becoming a politi-
cal point of reference in the national 
sphere. 
 
•  The results are ambiguous when it 
comes to defining a specific constellation. 
Europeans see the need for political lead-
ership by groups of countries, though they 
fear the predominance of the larger states. 
 
 
 
 
III 
Strategic leadership is  
better than  
crisis management 
The survey data demonstrate that Europe-
ans want strong political leadership pro-
vided by specific individuals as well as by 
specific groups of countries. However, en-
hanced leadership only seems to make 
sense if it is combined with a strategic 
perspective for the future of Europe. In 
practice what currently tends to predomi-
nate is crisis management prompted by 
the day-to-day political agenda and post 
hoc attempts to adapt to changes which 
have already taken place. Thus it is cer-
tainly true that the constitutional summit, 
which was held in a crisis-laden atmos-
phere, was a partial success and a step 
leading to institutional reform. What the 
Treaty of Amsterdam sought to do, which 
was to turn the EU as soon as possible into 
a viable entity with more than 30 member 
states, has tended to be overlooked in the 
course of the whole constitutional process. 
2009 may witness the implementation of 
provisions which should actually have en-
tered into force long before 2004. 
 
A new type of political leadership ought to 
supplant day-to-day crisis management 
and the politics of never-ending amend-
ments. European policymakers are in any 
case confronted with a plethora of chal-
lenges. Thus they will have to create the 
political and institutional framework for 
strategic leadership in order to provide 
European leaders with attractive possibili-
ties for decision-making. Whilst it is cer-
tainly right to encourage competition be-
tween leading politicians, it is important 
to prevent short-term posturing at the ex-
pense of European integration. It is the 
task of strategic leadership to provide a 
structure for the democratic process 
within and between states on the basis of 
competing and coherent draft policies. It is 
important that politicians should be held 
accountable for what they do. Four specific  
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
 
 
M
o
r
e
 
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
L
e
a
d
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
p
a
g
e
 
5
 
#
 
2
0
0
7
/
0
4
factors may well characterize the forth-
coming leadership debate: 
 
•  Leaders must cooperate. If the treaty of 
amendment enters into force there will be 
new leaders in Brussels. The President of 
the European Commission will have addi-
tional powers, as will the EU High Repre-
sentative for the Foreign and Security Pol-
icy. And as a result of the appointment of 
the President of the European Council, 
whose term of office lasts for two-and-a-
half years, Brussels will acquire a third 
leading figure who is bound to make an 
impression on the electorate. In addition 
to this, the reduction in the size of the 
European Commission will make it easier 
for Europeans to link EU policymaking 
with specific individuals, and thus to make 
them publicly accountable. 
 
There will be no dearth of leadership fig-
ures, at least in an institutional sense. 
Competition within the tripartite European 
leadership and the rivalry with the na-
tional heads of government will raise the 
electorate’s awareness of the European 
Union. However, there is a danger that the 
leaders will neutralize each other, or, 
worse still, that they will unleash cen-
trifugal forces which, in the final analysis, 
will lead to even more stalemate. In addi-
tion to a capacity to define political guide-
lines and to defend personal principles in 
complex situations, the new European 
leaders must possess an aptitude for 
teamwork and the ability to promote inte-
gration. 
 
•  The  tripartite presidency should func-
tion in a more coherent manner. In addi-
tion to the appointment of the common 
President of the European Council, the 
European governments must ensure that 
priorities do not change every six months. 
In the past every presidency has declared 
its own pet subject to be a strategic pro-
ject for the whole of the EU. Here the tri-
partite presidency must strive for a more 
coherent approach. Hitherto the emer-
gence of a common agenda has depended 
on the member states and their willing-
ness to cooperate. There has never been 
any kind of compulsory institutional re-
quirement to participate. In contrast to 
this, a genuine common tripartite presi-
dency would also take into account the 
wishes of the smaller states. By pooling 
their resources and concentrating in a 
sensible way on specific priorities, they in 
particular could increase their influence 
on how the EU develops. If they were to 
form a constructive coalition, all three 
would benefit from the opportunity to en-
hance their reputations, which would in-
evitably be the result of a successful 
presidency. 
„There will be no dearth 
of leadership figures“ 
•  The European political parties should be 
strengthened. Political parties, like indi-
vidual politicians, also have a duty to pro-
vide leadership. They in particular can en-
courage greater politicization in the EU, 
and thus initiate a public debate about dif-
ferent draft policies relating to the future 
of the European integration process. By 
the time of the European elections in 
2009, each family of European political 
parties should have created its own supra-
national profile. Each political grouping 
should present a set of political messages 
to the electorate in a uniform manner 
throughout Europe, and each should field 
its own candidate for the office of the 
President of the Commission. This will 
demonstrate quite clearly its will to gov-
ern and to provide accountable leadership. 
 
•  Eliminate veto players. The debate about 
the fate of the European constitution, 
which was conducted on the basis of con-
flicting national interests, and the ensuing 
compromise reached at the summit in 
Brussels have made it seem likely that 
Europe will be based on “the lowest com-
mon denominator.” However, if European 
policymaking takes its bearings from 
those who are unwilling to move ahead, it 
will slowly lose the support of all the oth-
ers. It will be of decisive importance in the 
years ahead to eliminate veto players at an  
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early stage.   Institutional provisions such 
as the extension of majority decision-
making point in the right direction. How-
ever, there is still a need for functioning 
leadership groups in the European Union.  
Their task would be to create an atmos-
phere which would make it very difficult 
for veto players to stand out against the 
perceived interests of the majority. 
 
IV 
Leadership groups are 
needed more than ever 
There have always been informal leader-
ship groups in the European Union. Some-
times they consisted simply of Germany 
and France, which were sometimes joined 
by the Benelux countries. Sometimes all of 
the founding member states acting in con-
cert provided a strategic impetus for the 
development of the Union. The waves of 
enlargement in recent years have rendered 
the formation of coalitions more difficult. 
Whereas in EU 15 Germany and France 
were often the two extremes of the con-
temporary range of preferences, interest 
constellations have now become far more 
varied. Traditional coalitions which often 
attract less attention are also breaking up. 
Thus northern European countries com-
plain that they are being ignored by the 
British, whereas the Netherlands and Bel-
gium have drifted apart with regard to 
their basic stance towards integration pol-
icy. Furthermore, solidarity among the 
central and eastern European states often 
no longer exists. 
 
New and stage-managed coalitions such as 
the Weimar triangle have acquired a ritu-
alistic character devoid of meaning of any 
kind. In addition to the political aspect of 
interest diversity, the formation of new 
coalitions is bedevilled by a problem of a 
more technical kind. In EU 27 the sheer 
number of views and attitudes make it dif-
ficult and perhaps in fact impossible to 
know what the other parties actually want 
in any given instance. For this reason coa-
litions are highly volatile, and unpredict-
able even for the participants. 
„There have always been 
informal leadership 
groups in the  
European Union.” 
On account of the diverging interest con-
stellations in EU 27 there is a need for 
member-state leadership groups. It is true 
that the Commission and the Council can 
keep the European Union on the right 
track in individual policy areas. However,  
leadership group consisting of several 
m e m b e r  s t a t e s  w i l l  h a v e  t o  a s s e r t  i t s e l f  
whenever it is a question of fundamental 
institutional reforms or a political change 
of course in the integration project. The 
recent EU summit, which decided the fate 
of the European constitution, was a good 
example of the fact that there is some-
times a need for an alliance between cer-
tain member states in order to overcome 
the kind of stalemate which has occasion-
ally held up the European integration 
process. 
 
V 
The Big Three 
The Eurogroup is both too large and too 
diverse to produce real leadership. As is 
demonstrated by the survey data, Europe-
ans no longer have a high opinion of the 
Franco-German axis. It is true, of course, 
that the deepening of the Élysée process 
led to an intensification of Franco-German 
relations on a working level, and that a 
closely-knit web of cooperation arose. Yet 
significant examples of joint European ini-
tiatives are few and far between. In future 
the only realistic leadership group will be 
the big three–Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom. 
 
In the past a compromise between Ger-
many and France was often acceptable as 
far as the other member states were con-
cerned. Similarly, a prior compromise  
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reached by the big three will probably 
make it easier to reach a compromise in 
EU 27. These countries usually at variance 
with regard to all those topics which con-
tinue to be controversial in the EU. These 
include different views of the welfare 
state, the introduction of the euro, and the 
Schengen agreement, foreign and security 
policy traditions, and, last but not least, 
the fundamental integration policy para-
digms. The constitutional summit demon-
strated once again that those who want to 
hold up the proceedings must win over the 
British, and so must those who are eager 
to make progress. 
 
If the big three were able to identify mani-
festly different interests and potential con-
flicts at an early stage, the result might 
well be a new constructive and strategic 
coalition in the European Union.  
 
It is important to remember that this lead-
ership group will only be tolerated by the 
other member states if it consists of three 
countries and no more. As soon as a fourth 
country insists on joining this conclave, a 
whole series of medium-sized member 
states will also want to gain admittance. 
 
Whether or not the big three can function 
in the EU as a constructive coalition is in 
the first instance up to them. And then the 
United Kingdom under Brown will have to 
become a pro-European actor. At first sight 
the British attitude at the constitutional 
summit does not seem to suggest that this 
will be the case. In fact, instead of provid-
ing leadership, the United Kingdom was 
once again a veto player. The opt-outs in 
the case of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and home affairs and justice policy 
demonstrated that the United Kingdom 
was, as in the past, the odd man out with 
regard to fundamental EU policies. In the 
long run it will hardly be feasible to stand 
aloof and to lay claim to a leadership role 
at one and the same time. 
 
That there will be greater European in-
volvement by the new British government 
is suggested, for example, by the fact that 
the younger members of the cabinet 
clearly have a far more pragmatic attitude 
to Europe. The notion that the Tories, act-
ing in conjunction with the tabloids’ Euro-
phobia, are trying to exert pressure on the 
new prime minister is true only to a cer-
tain extent. Brown cannot be suspected of 
being fervently in favour of integration, 
and this is the precise reason why he will 
be able to steer the United Kingdom to-
wards the centre of the European Union. 
And, last but not least, the United States is 
concerned to encourage the United King-
dom to play a greater role in Europe. The 
only kind of European Union that is of any 
use to the U.S. is one which is in a posi-
tion to play an important role in the global 
economic and security conflicts. And that 
is why Europe needs the United Kingdom. 
 
The leadership qualities and credibility of 
the tripartite presidency depend to an im-
portant extent on whether or not it proves 
possible to define common interests and 
goals on a bilateral level. The basis for this 
already exists. Even if the Franco-German  
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motor is running out of steam, the links 
continue to be very close. Despite their 
differences with regard to the war in Iraq, 
France and the United Kingdom still have 
a large number of things in common in the 
context of European security and defence 
policy. But Germany and the United King-
dom in particular have some catching up 
to do. In addition to intensifying the politi-
cal and cultural exchange between the two 
countries, they should try to define joint 
political projects.   In the light of the re-
view of the EU budget for 2008 this joint 
position could for example be a fundamen-
tal restructuring of the budget so that 
more is spent on research and education. 
 
However, common interests alone are not 
by themselves of decisive importance for 
future constructive coalitions. Just as im-
portant is the way in which leading politi-
cians interact on a personal level. The ri-
valry between Brown, Merkel and Sarkozy 
will only prove to be fruitful and produc-
tive if leadership is construed both as 
strength and as the ability to compromise. 
The extent to which other states will be 
willing to accept a constructive coalition of 
this kind will depend on how the leaders 
conduct themselves. An enduringly influ-
ential leadership group will first emerge 
when the other member states understand 
that, when all is said and done, the coali-
tion is wholly dedicated to the continuance 
of the common European project. 
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